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Abstract: 
On 10 April 2019, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom delivered judgment in the case 
Vedanta v. Lungowe, concerning the liability of an English company for environmental damage 
caused by its subsidiary in Zambia. The decision confirms that English parent companies can owe 
a duty of care to foreign claimants affected by operations of their subsidiaries abroad and that 
the English courts may have jurisdiction to hear such cases even when a foreign court is a more 
appropriate place for the trial. It establishes an important precedent for providing access to 
justice for foreign claimants in transnational corporate liability litigation. Given the global 
presence of English companies, and the fact that their foreign subsidiaries have been involved in 
multiple cases of environmental damage in the host states, the decision could give an impetus to 
future claims brought in the English courts. Also, the decision opens some interesting possibilities 
for climate change liability litigation against English parent companies and their foreign 
subsidiaries, as their cumulative greenhouse gas emissions would likely be considerably higher 
than taken separately, arguably making prospective claims against them more viable. 
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1. Introduction 
Widespread environmental degradation and the resulting harms to human communities caused 
by business operations of large corporate entities are a sad and well-known reality. Exceptionally 
disastrous and transboundary incidents, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico,1 can attract global media attention and lead to legal scrutiny, revealing the persistent 
problem of poor safety standards and violation of environmental laws and regulations that seems 
to permeate corporate culture.2 Even more widespread environmental threats that are of truly 
planetary scale, such as climate change, are also increasingly linked to large corporate entities 
which had early knowledge of the risks posed by their activities and had opportunities to mitigate 
those risks, but repeatedly failed to do so or, even worse, tried to mislead the public by spreading 
misinformation campaigns and lobbying regulators against taking action.3   
However, while the activities leading or contributing to large-scale environmental damage come 
under ever-increasing legal scrutiny in developed countries, the same activities can easily go 
unchecked in developing countries, potentially leaving the most vulnerable groups of local people 
unprotected. Such people may be unable to pursue litigation due to a lack of funds or experienced 
lawyers. They may often be employed by, and thus be dependent on, the polluting entity. As if 
this were not enough, the operations of the polluting entity may be controlled not by a local 
branch but from an office of its parent company located thousands of miles away. Without any 
means of protecting themselves in the local courts, the affected communities may thus have only 
one viable option – to seek justiĐe iŶ the Đouƌts of the paƌeŶt ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s hoŵe state.    
On 10 April 2019, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UK) delivered judgment in exactly 
such a case, Vedanta v. Lungowe,4 which concerns the liability of an English company for 
environmental damage caused by its foreign subsidiary in Zambia. The decision confirmed that 
English parent companies could owe a duty of care to foreign claimants affected by operations of 
their subsidiaries abroad and that the English courts could have jurisdiction to hear such cases 
even when a foreign court is a more appropriate place for the trial. This finding will likely have a 
significant impact as many English companies have numerous subsidiaries abroad, and the latter 
have been involved in multiple cases of environmental damage in the host states. The decision 
could, therefore, give an impetus to future claims brought in the English courts. Furthermore, 
apart from its relevance to corporate environmental liability in general, the decision opens some 
 
1 In April 2010, the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, operated by BP (a British oil and gas 
multinational corporation (MNC)) led to the largest marine oil spill in history, causing vast environmental 
damage. See J. Beyeƌ et al., ͚EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal Effects of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Reǀieǁ͛ (2016) 
110(1) Marine Pollution Bulletin, pp. 28-51.  
2 See, e.g., M.A. Cherry & J.F. “ŶeiƌsoŶ, ͚BeǇoŶd Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Greenwashing after the BP Oil Disasteƌ͛ (2010) 85(4) Tulane Law Review, pp. 983-1038, at 984. 
3 See, e.g., Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), ͚“ŵoke aŶd Fuŵes: The Legal aŶd EǀideŶtiaƌǇ 
Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable for the Climate Cƌisis͛, Noǀ. ϮϬϭϳ, aǀailaďle at: 
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Smoke-Fumes.pdf; G. Supran & N. Oreskes, ͚AssessiŶg 
EǆǆoŶMoďil͛s Cliŵate ChaŶge CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ;ϭϵϳϳ–ϮϬϭϰͿ͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ ϭϮ;ϴͿ Environmental Research Letters, 
pp. 1-18, at 12-15; P.C. Fƌuŵhoff, ‘. Heede & N. Oƌeskes, ͚The Cliŵate ‘espoŶsiďilities of IŶdustƌial CaƌďoŶ 
PƌoduĐeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ϭϯϮ;ϮͿ Climatic Change, pp. 157-171, at 161-166. 
4 Vedanta Resources PLC and another (Appellants) v. Lungowe and others (Respondents) [2019] UKSC 20, 
on appeal from: [2017] EWCA Civ 1528 (Vedanta). 
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interesting possibilities for climate change liability litigation against English parent companies and 
their foreign subsidiaries, as their cumulative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would likely be 
considerably higher than taken separately, arguably making prospective claims against them 
more viable.  
Part two of this article discusses the case and the reasoning of the English courts in determining 
jurisdiction. The third part considers the transnational significance of the case by positioning it in 
the context of similar litigation in England and abroad. The fourth analyzes the relevance of the 
decision for prospective claims against English companies and their foreign subsidiaries for 
contributing to climate change. The final part concludes by summarizing some long-term 
implications of the decision. 
 
2. Circumstances of the case 
For many years, the Nchanga Copper Mine in the Chingola District of Zambia – allegedly the 
second largest in the world and the largest private employer in the country – has been discharging 
toxic emissions into the watercourses used by exceptionally poor members of local rural farming 
communities for drinking, irrigation and other essential purposes.5 The owner of the mine is 
Konkola Copper Mines plc (KCM), a public company incorporated in Zambia and subsidiary of 
Vedanta Resources plc (Vedanta) – a multinational group incorporated and domiciled in England.6 
KCM is not fully owned by Vedanta as the Zambian government has a significant minority stake.7 
However, according to materials published by Vedanta, the ultiŵate ĐoŶtƌol of KCM is Ŷot ͚to ďe 
regarded as any less than it would be if wholly owned͛.8  
In 2015, a group of 1826 Zambian citizens initiated proceedings against both KCM and Vedanta 
before the England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) alleging personal 
injury, damage to property and loss of income, amenity and enjoyment of land due to 
environmental damage caused by discharges from the mine since 2005.9  KCM was sued as the 
operator of Nchanga Copper Mine.10 Vedanta was sued because it maintained high control and 
direction over the mining operations of KCM and the latter had to comply with health, safety and 
 
5 Dominic Liswaniso Lungowe & Others v. Vedanta Resources Plc & Konkola Copper Mines Plc [2016] EWHC 
975 (TCC) (Lungowe), para. 12. 
6 Ibid., para. 13. In this article, the teƌŵ ͚EŶglaŶd͛ is used as a shoƌthaŶd eǆpƌessioŶ foƌ juƌisdiĐtioŶ iŶ 
England and Wales. 
7 At the tiŵe of the “upƌeŵe Couƌt͛s deĐisioŶ, VedaŶta held ŶeaƌlǇ ϴϬ% of KCM͛s shaƌes; the ƌeŵaiŶiŶg 
20% were held by ZCCM Investment Holdings plc, almost entirely owned by the Zambian government. The 
latter also had a golden share in KCM. See information on KCM shareholding available at: 
http://kcm.co.zm/corporate-profile/company-overview/shareholding.  
8 Vedanta, para. 2. 
9 Hoǁeǀeƌ, as oďseƌǀed ďǇ the High Couƌt, ͚theƌe aƌe Ŷo details aďout theiƌ iŶjuƌies, theiƌ laŶd, oƌ theiƌ 
alleged losses͛ ;Vedanta, para. 11). 
10 Notably, this was not the first time that KCM was sued over its polluting activities. Thus, the initial legal 
action against KCM dates back to the mid-2000s, when a group of local residents brought a similar lawsuit 
Nyasulu and 2,000 others v. KCM (2007/HP/1286) before Zambian courts. The case is discussed in more 
detail below.   
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environmental standards established by Vedanta.11 The claims were based on the common law 
of negligence, nuisance, trespass and breach of statutory duty in accordance with Zambian law.12  
 
2.1. Jurisdiction  
Both Vedanta and KCM challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts. They asserted that the 
case did not disclose a real justiciable issue against Vedanta because it could not ͚be shown to 
have done anything in relation to the operation of the Mine sufficient either to give rise to a 
common law duty of care in favour of the claimants, or a statutory liability as a participant in 
breaches of Zambian environmental protection, mining and public health legislation͛.13 
Furthermore, the defendants argued that even if a real justiciable issue were disclosed against 
Vedanta, the case should be dismissed for being an abuse of European Union (EU) laǁ ͚ďeĐause 
the claimants [were] using a claim against Vedanta in England purely as a vehicle for attracting 
English jurisdiction against their real target defendant, KCM,14 by means of the necessary or 
proper party gateǁaǇ͛ under the Civil Procedure Rules.  
The necessary or proper party gateway is provided under Paragraph 3.1(3) of Practice Direction 
6B of the Court Procedure Rules (CPR), giving the English courts the power to authorize service of 
process to parties outside the jurisdiction when:  
;ϯͿ A Đlaiŵ is ŵade agaiŶst a peƌsoŶ ;͚the defeŶdaŶt͛Ϳ oŶ ǁhoŵ the Đlaiŵ foƌŵ has ďeeŶ 
or will be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and – 
(a) there is between the claimant and the defendant a real issue which it is reasonable 
for the court to try; and 
(b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a necessary or 
proper party to that claim. 
Based on these provisions, the claimants obtained an order to serve process against KCM as the 
necessary or proper party to the proceedings against Vedanta, the first defendant, which was 
domiciled in England. According to the practice direction, the court reserves discretion under the 
CPR 6.37(3) to deny permission to serve outside the jurisdiction unless it is satisfied that England 
 
11 Lungowe, para. 31. The primary way in which the case was put was in negligence: according to the 
ĐlaiŵaŶts, VedaŶta͛s dutǇ of Đaƌe aƌose as a ƌesult of its assuŵptioŶ of ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ ͚foƌ eŶsuƌiŶg that 
[KCM]͛s ŵiŶiŶg opeƌatioŶs do Ŷot Đause haƌŵ to the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt oƌ loĐal ĐoŵŵuŶities, as eǀideŶĐed ďǇ 
the very high level of control and direction that [Vedanta] exercise at all material times over the mining 
operations of [KCM] and its compliance with applicable health, safety and environmental standards͛. 
12 Ibid., paras 31-8. 
13 Vedanta, para. 17. 
14 Jurisdiction against Vedanta derived from Art. 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L351/1, 
according to which persons domiciled in an EU Member State shall be sued in the courts of that Member 
State. Notably, the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, although the EU law will continue to apply until 31 
December 2020.  
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is the proper place for the trial.  In order to properly exercise this discretion, the High Court 
addressed the following five questions:15  
(a) Does the claiŵaŶts͛ Đlaiŵ agaiŶst KCM haǀe a ƌeal pƌospeĐt of suĐĐess? 
(b) If so, is there a real issue between the claimants and Vedanta? 
(c) Is it reasonable for the court to try that issue? 
(d) Is KCM a necessary or proper party to the claim against Vedanta? 
(e) Is England the proper place in which to bring the claim? 
After considering these questions, the High Couƌt disŵissed VedaŶta͛s aŶd KCM͛s appliĐatioŶs 
against hearing the case in England by finding in favour of the claimants on the question of a real 
issue against the anchor defendant, Vedanta.16 Both the Court of Appeal17 and the Supreme 
Court18 upheld this decision.  
 
2.2. Vedanta’s duty of care 
The Supreme Couƌt͛s aŶalǇsis iŶĐluded assessiŶg ǁhetheƌ VedaŶta ͚eǆeƌĐised a suffiĐieŶtlǇ high 
level of supervision and control of the activities at the mine, with sufficient knowledge of the 
propensity of those activities to cause toxic escapes into surrounding watercourses, as to incur a 
dutǇ of Đaƌe to the ĐlaiŵaŶts͛.19 Most importantly, the Court emphasized that establishing any 
relevant duty in a paƌeŶt/suďsidiaƌǇ ƌelatioŶship ͚depeŶds oŶ the eǆteŶt to which, and the way in 
which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, control, supervise 
oƌ adǀise the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of the ƌeleǀaŶt opeƌatioŶs ;iŶĐludiŶg laŶd useͿ of the suďsidiaƌǇ͛.20 In 
the present case, the Court concluded from the materials proffered by the claimants that Vedanta 
did iŶ faĐt asseƌt ͚its ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ the estaďlishŵeŶt of appƌopƌiate gƌoup-wide 
environmental control and sustainability standards, for their implementation throughout the 
group by trainiŶg, aŶd foƌ theiƌ ŵoŶitoƌiŶg aŶd eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt͛.21 
 
2.3. Access to justice 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal found that although Zambia was the proper place to 
ďƌiŶg the Đlaiŵ, ͚theƌe ǁas a ƌeal ƌisk that the ĐlaiŵaŶts ǁould Ŷot oďtaiŶ suďstaŶtial justiĐe iŶ 
the )aŵďiaŶ juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛.22 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that  
 
15 Lungowe, para. 97. 
16 Lungowe, para. 199. 
17 Lungowe and Others v. Vedanta Resources Plc and Another [2017] EWCA Civ 1528, para. 136. 
18 Vedanta, paras 22 and 102. 
19 Ibid., para. 55. 
20 Ibid., para. 49. 
21 Iďid. While Ŷot a huŵaŶ ƌights Đase, the “upƌeŵe Couƌt͛s aƌtiĐulatioŶ of VedaŶta͛s dutǇ of Đaƌe toǁaƌds 
the claimants is quite consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, available 
at: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf, which call for 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights regardless of the business structure. See Principle 14.  
22 Ibid. para. 22.  
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Even if the court concludes […] that a foreign jurisdiction is the proper place in which the 
case should be tried, the court may nonetheless permit (or refuse to set aside) service of 
English proceedings on the foreign defendant if satisfied, by cogent evidence, that there 
is a real risk that substantial justice will not be obtainable in that foreign jurisdiction.23 
The Court further stated that the question of whether substantial justice is obtainable requires 
careful analysis of distinctive evidence.24 In this case, the Court considered the availability of 
resources, both financial and technical expertise, to effectively litigate a case of such complexity 
as the determining factor in assessing whether substantial justice was attainable for the claimants 
in the foreign jurisdiction.25 The evidence assessed by the court included cases concerning 
environmental damage and the testimony of the claimants and Zambian lawyers.26   
On the question of funding, the High Court made the following finding that was deemed relevant 
by the Supreme Court:  
The claimants have been described as being considerably below the average income 
eaƌŶeƌs iŶ )aŵďia. GiǀeŶ that )aŵďia is oŶe of the ǁoƌld͛s pooƌest ĐouŶtƌies, ǁheƌe the 
vast majority live at subsistence levels […], the claimants would not be able to afford any 
legal representation.27 
The court relied on the case Lubbe v. Cape plc,28 involving litigants from South Africa, in which the 
House of Lords found that the ͚lack of the means, in South Africa, to prosecute [the] claims to a 
conclusion provides a compelling ground […] for refusing to stay the proceedings͛.29 In Vedanta, 
the High Court compared the legal systems and economic situation in both South Africa and 
Zambia and concluded that there was compelling evidence that access to justice would be 
unavailable to the claimants who were worse off than their South African counterparts in Lubbe: 
South Africa is the largest economy in southern Africa. It is a country where [Conditional 
Fee Agreements (CFAs)] are lawful. In addition, it has one of the most developed legal 
systems in the world. Yet despite all of that, the House of Lords concluded that the 
claimants would not obtain access to justice there. The general evidence in that case 
about South Africa contrasts starkly with the evidence here about Zambia, which is one 
of the ǁoƌld͛s pooƌest ĐouŶtƌies. CFAs aƌe Ŷot laǁful theƌe. AŶd oŶ aŶǇ ǀieǁ the legal 
system in Zambia is not well developed: indeed, in 2012 Zambia was the subject of a 
 
23 Ibid., para. 89. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Lungowe, para. 184. 
27 Lungowe, para. 178. 
28 Lubbe and Ors v. Cape Plc [2000] UKHL 41 (concerning damages claims by over 3,000 South African 
residents and an English resident for personal injuries (and in some cases death) allegedly suffered as the 
result of exposure to asbestos and its related products in South Africa. The activities related to the 
production of asbestos were carried out by a South African subsidiary of the defendant, an English company 
named Cape, Plc. 
29 Ibid. 
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report by the Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy which highlighted the 
dearth of lawyers in Zambia, and the consequences for its citizens.30 
Based on the analysis of the decided cases and witness testimony, the High Court found that it 
was impossible for the claimants to obtain legal aid, that there was a dearth of lawyers in 
Chingola, the town where the alleged pollution occurred; furthermore, the lawyers lacked the 
relevant expertise to prosecute a case of this magnitude. 31   
Finally, the Supreme Court was persuaded that ͚the tƌaĐk ƌeĐoƌd iŶ )aŵďia of litigatioŶ of this 
kiŶd͛32 ͚Đould Ŷot giǀe aŶ aspiƌiŶg litigaŶt iŶ a gƌoup aĐtioŶ dealiŶg ǁith eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal issues aŶǇ 
confidence that these cases would be appropriately managed and resolved͛.33 The Supreme Court 
highlighted two decided cases, namely, Benson Shamilimo and 41 others v. Nitrogen Chemicals of 
Zambia Ltd34 and Nyasulu and 2,000 others v. KCM.35  In Shamilimo, concerning claims by a group 
of persons who were allegedly exposed to radiation, the claimants could not establish a causal 
link between ͚their illnesses (which were proved) and the exposure to radiation (which was also 
proved)͛.36 The UK Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the claimants 
failed to prove causation because they ͚could not fund the necessary expert evidence to prove 
it͛.37 In Nyasulu, a claim for damages arising from the discharge of effluent into the Mushishima 
Stream leading to pollution of the water source which feeds into the Kafue river, the claimants 
were awarded damages by the High Court.38 On the appeal to the Supreme Court of Zambia, the 
damages awarded to 1,989 claimants were set aside due to the lack of medical evidence to prove 
that the claimants had suffered any loss.39 The UK Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that 
͚theƌe ǁas iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ďoth those Đases eǀideŶĐe fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh the judge ǁas eŶtitled to ĐoŶĐlude 
that they supported rather than detracted from his overall finding that funding and local legal 
resources were insufficient to enable the claimants to obtain substantial justice in Zambia͛.40 
The decision in Vedanta thus eǆpaŶds the gƌouŶds that ǁould liŵit ĐlaiŵaŶts͛ ĐapaĐitǇ to obtain 
substantial justice, including the lack of technical expertise in addition to the lack of funding 
referred to in Lubbe. Notably, though, in both Lubbe and Vedanta the courts emphasized the need 
for evidence to demonstrate the unique circumstances of the particular cases in order to avoid 
creating a blanket precedent that lack of access to legal aid and financing would prevent claimants 
 
30 Lungowe, paras 175-176. 
31 Lungowe, para. 186. The dearth of lawyers was proved using a 2012 report on access to justice in Zambia 
by the Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy which highlighted the dearth of lawyers in Zambia, 
and the consequences for its citizens with only four lawyers in Chingola town. 
32 Ibid., para. 190. 
33 Ibid., para. 194. 
34 2007/HP/0725. 
35 2007/HP/1286. 
36 Lungowe, para. 191. 
37 Vedanda, p. 37.  
38 Lungowe, para. 191. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid., p. 37.  
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from obtaining access to justice in a foreign jurisdiction. The court applied the test of appropriate 
forum stated in the case of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd.41 
 
3. The transnational significance of the decision 
The decision in Vedanta is an important precedent for providing access to justice for foreign 
claimants in transnational corporate liability litigation.42 Given the global presence of English 
companies, and the fact that their foreign subsidiaries have been involved in multiple cases of 
environmental damage in the host states,43 including large-scale disasters such as the Mariana 
dam disaster in Brazil,44 Vedanta could give an impetus to future claims brought in the English 
courts. The litigation following the Mariana dam disaster is one of the most recent examples of 
an instance where this could happen, as the disaster resulted not only in proceedings against the 
subsidiary and both its parents in Brazil, but also proceedings in Australia, where shareholders 
filed a lawsuit against BHP Billiton, claiming that the company knew about the safety risks prior 
to the disaster but failed to take any action to prevent it, and in England, where more than 
240,000 claimants, including Brazilian municipalities and indigenous communities, filed a lawsuit 
against BHP Billiton seeking compensation for damages caused by the dam collapse.45  
 
3.1. Suing parent companies in their home state  
Depending on the circumstances, suing parent companies in their home states for the activities 
of their foreign subsidiaries may be advantageous or even vital to the ĐlaiŵaŶts͛ suĐĐess. For 
 
41 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] A.C. 460. The basic principle is that a stay will only 
be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the court is satisfied that some other available 
forum, having competent jurisdiction, is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, where the case 
may be tried more suitably in the interest of all the parties and for the ends of justice (Spiliada, p. 476). 
42 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss cases where the parent company itself was involved in the 
polluting activities abroad, or cases where the harm was caused by a subsidiary of an English company in 
England. 
43 E.g., Vedanta has subsidiaries not only in Zambia, but also in several other countries (details available at: 
https://www.vedantaresources.com/Pages/Home.aspx), including India and Ireland, where the mining 
operations of these subsidiaries caused air and groundwater pollution as well as damage to farmlands, 
resulting in litigation before national courts. See: Dunne v. Vedanta Lisheen Mining Limited [2016] IEHC 
500, High Court of Ireland; The State of Tamil Nadu and Others v. Vedanta Limited [2019] No. 23/2019, 
Supreme Court of India. 
44 The ϮϬϭϱ MaƌiaŶa daŵ disasteƌ is ĐoŶsideƌed to ďe the ǁoƌst eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal disasteƌ iŶ Bƌazil͛s histoƌǇ, 
with toxic waste from the collapsed mine devastating the local river and reaching the Atlantic Ocean as well 
as dealing irreversible damage to local animal and plant life and killing 19 people. The owner of the dam, 
Samarco MiŶeƌaçĆo “.A., is a joint venture of BHP, an Anglo-Australian mining, metals and petroleum 
company, and Vale S.A., a Brazilian metals and mining company. See B. TuŶĐak, ͚LessoŶs fƌoŵ the Samarco 
Disasteƌ͛ (2017) 2(1) Business and Human Rights Journal, pp. 157-62. Notably, in January 2019, Vale S.A. 
was involved in yet another catastrophic failure in one of its mines – the Brumadinho dam disaster – that 
left more than 200 people dead and local rivers and soil substantially polluted. 
45 See BusiŶess aŶd HuŵaŶ ‘ights ‘esouƌĐe CeŶtƌe, ͚BHP BillitoŶ & Vale laǁsuit ;ƌe daŵ Đollapse iŶ BƌazilͿ͛, 
available at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/bhp-billiton-vale-lawsuit-re-dam-collapse-in-
brazil.  
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example, the parent company may have the financial resources that are unavailable to the 
subsidiary to satisfy the claim. Thus, one of the concerns in Vedanta was that KCM would not 
have sufficient funds to cover the damages due to its uncertain financial position, with the High 
Court concluding that ͚theƌe is a ƌeal ƌisk that, ǁithout VedaŶta͛s suppoƌt, [KCM] ŵaǇ haǀe 
insufficient resources to meet the claims͛.46 Other financial considerations, such as the cost of 
litigation, and more favourable civil procedural arrangements can also render the home country 
a more attractive forum for litigation. These considerations can be decisive in determining that 
the claimants would not obtain substantial aĐĐess to justiĐe iŶ the host state͛s Đouƌts, as seen in 
Vedanta as well as other environmental cases, including the abovementioned Lubbe and Connelly 
v. RTZ Plc.47   
Similarly, the lack of legal expertise in the host state – as in Vedanta – can also be a decisive factor. 
In Zambia, this lack of expertise is also observable among trial courts, as demonstrated by Martha 
Mutizhe Kangwa & 27 others v. Zambia Environmental Management Agency & 2 others.48 The 
claimants contended that the construction of a cement factory would negatively affect the 
neighbouring farms by relying on expert testimony from a hydrologist, a mining engineer and a 
veterinary surgeon.49 The trial court rejected the testimony and dismissed the claim as it 
considered that these experts ͚ǁeƌe Ŷot eǆpeƌts iŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal issues, ďut eǆpeƌts iŶ segŵeŶts 
like ŵiŶiŶg, ǁateƌ, ǀeteƌiŶaƌǇ͛.50 On the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court 
misunderstood environmental issues in dismissing the testimony, as all these segments were 
facets of the environment as defined by the repealed Environmental Protection and Pollution 
control Act pursuant to which the claim was brought.51 Still, the Supreme Court held that the trial 
court was entitled to accept or decline the expert testimony based on the established principles 
of law of evidence regarding the weight that a court could attach to evidence.52  
Meanwhile, yet another critical reason for pursuing litigation abroad is ineffective enforcement 
iŶ the suďsidiaƌǇ͛s host state. The latter scenario is a persistent and acute problem in many 
 
46 Lungowe, paras 21-24, 80-82.  
47 Connelly v. RTZ Plc. [1998] AC 854. In Connelly, the claimant was a UK citizen who allegedly developed 
cancer while working in a uranium mine in Namibia operated by a South African company that was a 
subsidiary of an English company RTZ Plc. The claimant sued the parent company, alleging that it was 
negligent in the implementation of the policy and supervision of health, safety and environmental 
protection at the mine. 
48 2008/HP/245 (Kangwa). 
49 Kangwa, at J12. 
50 Ibid., at J49.  
51 Martha Mutizhe Kangwa & 27 Others v. Zambia Environmental Management Agency & 2 Others SCZ, 
SCZ/8//287/2011 Judgment No. 49 of 2014. 
52 Ibid.  
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developing countries,53 as illustrated by Gbemre v. Shell Nigeria.54 Gbemre was remarkable in 
several ways, most notably because, among other things, it was the very first case raising the 
issue of climate change in an African court. The claimant alleged that the oil production activities 
(gas flaring) of the defendants, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC) and 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, adversely affected his life and health as well as the 
local environment thus violating his rights to life and dignity, enshrined in the Nigerian 
Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.55 The Federal High Court of 
Nigeria ǁas peƌsuaded ďǇ the ĐlaiŵaŶt͛s aƌguŵeŶts.56 However, the decision was never enforced 
and did not halt the practice of gas flaring in Nigeria.57  
Understandably, home state courts dealing with transnational cases where the host state͛s legal 
system allegedly suffers from a lack of expertise or effective enforcement will exercise particular 
caution in order to avoid ƌaisiŶg ͚seƌious issues of ĐoŵitǇ aŶd eǆoƌďitaŶt juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛58 and thus 
refuse to hear such claims. However, the abovementioned scenarios also demonstrate that 
victims of corporate abuse, particularly those from developing countries, may face a poor choice 
between having their case against both the parent and the subsidiary companies heard in the 
hoŵe state͛s courts or, possibly, not having it heard at all.59  
 
 
 
 
53 It has been observed that even if victims of environmental damage and human rights abuses succeed in 
their cases brought before African national courts or regional international bodies, the failure of many 
African governments to enforce these decisions significantly impedes access to justice. See, e.g., L. Chenwi, 
͚The ‘ight to a “atisfaĐtoƌǇ, HealthǇ, aŶd “ustaiŶaďle EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt iŶ the AfƌiĐaŶ ‘egioŶal Human Rights 
“Ǉsteŵ͛, iŶ J.H. Knox & R. Pejan (eds), The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), pp. 59-85; see also the chapters 37, 42 and 43 discussing the particular vulnerability of 
communities in Africa to environmental and human rights abuses in J.R. May & E. Daly (eds), Human Rights 
and the Environment: Legality, Indivisibility, Dignity and Geography (Edward Elgar, 2019). 
54 Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria Ltd and Ors, (2005), Federal High 
Court, Suit No: FHC/B/CS/53/05.   
55 Gbemre, p. 1. “ee AfƌiĐaŶ Chaƌteƌ oŶ HuŵaŶ aŶd Peoples͛ ‘ights, BaŶjul, ϭϵ JaŶuaƌǇ ϭϵϴϮ, OAU DoĐ 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5. 
56 Gbemre, pp. 30-1. 
57 See B. Faturoti, G. Agbaitoro & O. Onya, ͚EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal PƌoteĐtioŶ iŶ the NigeƌiaŶ Oil aŶd Gas IŶdustƌǇ 
and Jonah Gbemre v. Shell PDC Nigeria Limited: Let the PluŶdeƌ CoŶtiŶue?͛ (2019) 27(2) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, pp. 225-45, at 235-6; E. Ukala, ͚Gas flaƌiŶg iŶ Nigeƌia͚s Nigeƌ Delta: 
Failed Promises and Reviving Community VoiĐes͛ (2010) 2(1) Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment, pp. 97-126. 
58 E.M. Blanco & B. PoŶtiŶ, ͚LitigatiŶg Extraterritorial Nuisances under English Common Law and UK Statute͛ 
(2017) 6(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 285-308, at 305. See also the UK Supreme Court in 
Vedanta, para. ϭϭ, ŶotiŶg that ͚a ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that a foƌeigŶ juƌisdiĐtioŶ ǁould Ŷot pƌoǀide suďstaŶtial justice 
ƌisks offeŶdiŶg iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵitǇ.͛ 
59 See, e.g., C.A. Whytock & C. Buƌke ‘oďeƌtsoŶ, ͚Foƌuŵ Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign 
JudgŵeŶts͛ (2011) 111(7) Columbia Law Review, pp. 1444-1521, discussing how different standards in the 
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine can create a transnational access to justice gap; see also 
M. GaƌdŶeƌ, ͚‘etiƌiŶg Foƌuŵ NoŶ CoŶǀeŶieŶs͛ (2017) 92(2) New York University Law Review, pp. 390-461. 
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3.2. Transnational corporate liability for environmental damage 
IŶ todaǇ͛s gloďalized ǁoƌld, multinational corporations (MNCs) haǀe ďeĐoŵe ͚ďoth legallǇ 
uďiƋuitous aŶd Ǉet legallǇ iŶǀisiďle͛60 due to their presence in multiple jurisdictions and legal 
separation between the parent companies and the subsidiaries.61  At the time of writing, numbers 
of such corporations and their subsidiaries are reaching into the six digits and seven digits, 
respectively.62 The subsidiaries often operate and cause harm in developing countries with a 
weaker rule of law,63 where vulnerable populations risk becoming hostages of MNCs͛ business 
deals with local governments.64 Vulnerable groups are further hampered by rules such as forum 
non conveniens and arrangements such as the corporate veil, which play into the hands of 
MNCs.65 These situations can lead to severe social and environmental justice problems66 and even 
human rights violations.67 In the absence of international law provisions addressing 
extraterritorial abuses by MNCs,68 and the near-universal absence of such legislation at the 
 
60 V. Gƌossǁald CuƌƌaŶ, ͚HaƌŵoŶiziŶg MultiŶatioŶal PaƌeŶt CoŵpaŶǇ LiaďilitǇ foƌ FoƌeigŶ “uďsidiaƌǇ HuŵaŶ 
Rights ViolatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϭϲͿ ϭϳ;ϮͿ Chicago Journal of International Law, pp. 403-446, at 406. 
61 Ibid., p. 408. 
62 G.L. “kiŶŶeƌ, ͚BeǇoŶd Kioďel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human 
Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-KioďelͿ Woƌld͛ (2014) 46(1) Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review, pp. 158-265, at 168. 
63 See, for example, the discussion on the large-scale environmental degradation, including air, water and 
land pollution, in Nigeria, caused by oil exploration, in H.P. Faga & U. Uchechukwu, ͚Oil EǆploƌatioŶ, 
Environmental Degradation, and Future Generations in the Niger Delta: Options for Enforcement of 
IŶteƌgeŶeƌatioŶal ‘ights aŶd “ustaiŶaďle DeǀelopŵeŶt Thƌough Legal aŶd JudiĐial AĐtiǀisŵ͛ (2019) 34 
Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, pp. 185-218, at 194-204. See, also, the discussion on the role 
of MNCs in dumping of toxic waste in African countries in M.V.“. “iƌleaf, ͚PƌoseĐutiŶg DiƌtǇ DuŵpiŶg iŶ 
AfƌiĐa͛, iŶ C.C. Jalloh, K.M. Clarke & V.O. Nmehielle (eds), The African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples' Rights in Context: Development and Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 553-589. 
64 R. Bƌatspies, ͚Coƌƌupt at Its Coƌe: Hoǁ Laǁ Failed the ViĐtiŵs of Waste DuŵpiŶg iŶ Cote d'Iǀoiƌe͛ (2018) 
43(2) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 417-473 (discussing the large-scale illegal resource 
extraction in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Russia as well as the multiple incidents of violations of law 
before, during and after the dumping of particularly hazardous waste in Cote d'Ivoire by different parties 
involved). 
65 For a discussion on how these doctrines benefit MNCs see, for example, J.A. KiƌshŶeƌ, ͚WhǇ is the U“ 
Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the 
AlieŶ Toƌt “tatute͛ (2012) 30(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law, pp. 259-302, at 264-265; A. Yilmaz 
Vastardis & R. Chaŵďeƌs, ͚OǀeƌĐoŵiŶg the Coƌpoƌate Veil ChalleŶge: Could IŶǀestŵeŶt Laǁ IŶspiƌe the 
Pƌoposed BusiŶess aŶd HuŵaŶ ‘ights TƌeatǇ?͛ (2018) 67(2) International & Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 
389-423. 
66 H.M. OsofskǇ, ͚Cliŵate Change and Environmental Justice: Reflections on Litigation over Oil Extraction 
and Rights ViolatioŶs iŶ Nigeƌia͛ (2010) 1(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, pp. 189-210, at 
192. 
67 See, for example, I.I. OŶǁuazoŵďe, ͚HuŵaŶ ‘ights Aďuse aŶd ViolatioŶs iŶ Nigeƌia: A Case “tudǇ of the 
Oil-PƌoduĐiŶg CoŵŵuŶities iŶ the Nigeƌ Delta ‘egioŶ͛ (2017) 22(1) Annual Survey of International and 
Comparative Law, pp. 115-160, at 118; A. Grear & B.H. Weston, ͚The Betrayal of Human Rights and the 
Urgency of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel LaǁsĐape͛ (2015) 15(1) Human 
Rights Law Review, pp. 21-44, at 40, oďseƌǀiŶg that ͚human rights are inadequately protected in the face 
of TNC ĐoŵpleǆitǇ, poǁeƌ aŶd gloďal iŶflueŶĐe͛ aŶd that ͚the ǀaƌious legal stƌategies deploǇed to pƌoteĐt 
human rights by recruiting alternative legal avenues and forms of accountability are ultimately 
uŶsatisfǇiŶg͛.  
68 R.V. Percival, ͚Gloďal Law and the EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ (2011) 86(3) Washington Law Review, pp. 579-634, at 
601-602; A. Gƌeaƌ, ͚CoƌpoƌatioŶs, HuŵaŶ ‘ights, aŶd the Age of GloďalizatioŶ: AŶotheƌ Look at the ͞Daƌk 
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national level,69 the decisions of home state courts on the liability of parent companies for the 
harms caused by their foreign subsidiaries are vital. At the same time, such cases are highly fact-
specific.70  
Thus, in contrast to Vedanta, the English courts dismissed Okpabi v. Shell,71 a case concerning oil 
pollution in Nigeria that has affected wide areas of land across the Niger Delta and local 
waterways, disrupting the lives of a considerable number of people. The claimants – about 42,500 
Nigerian citizens – sued Royal Dutch Shell plc (RDS), an Anglo-Dutch company, and its local 
subsidiary SPDC, responsible for onshore oil operations in Nigeria, in the English courts.72 The 
claimants sought daŵages aƌisiŶg fƌoŵ ͚seƌious aŶd oŶgoiŶg pollutioŶ aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal 
damage caused by oil spills emanatiŶg fƌoŵ the defeŶdaŶts͛ oil pipeliŶes aŶd assoĐiated 
infrastructure.73 The High Court ruled that the claims could not proceed in the English courts 
because there was no justiciable issue against the parent company as its control over the 
suďsidiaƌǇ͛s aĐtivities was insufficient to establish a duty of care vis-à-vis the claimants.74 On 
appeal, Lord Justice Sales was of opinion that the ĐlaiŵaŶts ͚[had] shown at this stage that they 
have a good arguable case that RDS owed them a duty of care at the material times and that it 
breached that duty of care, resulting in losses to the claimants of a kind in respect of which 
damages are recoverable͛.75 The Court of Appeal majority, though, upheld the decision of the 
High Court.76 The ŵajoƌitǇ͛s deĐisioŶ, however, is open to criticism foƌ takiŶg ͚a highlǇ restrictive 
 
“ide͟ iŶ the TǁeŶtǇ-Fiƌst CeŶtuƌǇ͛, iŶ B.H. Weston & A. Grear (eds) Human Rights in the World Community: 
Issues and Action (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp. 416- 426, at 418-421; P. MuĐhliŶski, ͚The 
Development of Human Rights Responsibilities for Multinational EŶteƌpƌises͛, iŶ R. Sullivan & M. Robinson 
(eds), Business and Human Rights: Dilemmas and Solutions (Routledge, 2017), pp. 33-51, at 38-39.  
69 See D. Paloŵďo, ͚The DutǇ of Caƌe of the PaƌeŶt CoŵpaŶǇ: A CoŵpaƌisoŶ ďetǁeeŶ FƌeŶĐh Laǁ, UK 
PƌeĐedeŶts aŶd the “ǁiss Pƌoposals͛ (2019) 4(2) Business and Human Rights Journal, pp. 265-286, at 275: 
At political level, attempts to introduce corporate duty of vigilance legislation in several countries have 
consistently faced opposition, alleging that such legislation would put national businesses in a 
disadvantaged position comparing to foreign companies due to potential exposure to liability litigation. The 
notable exception to this is France, which in 2017 became the first country to pass legislation establishing 
͚a due diligeŶĐe oďligatioŶ foƌ FƌeŶĐh paƌeŶt ĐoŵpaŶies to ŵoŶitoƌ the eǆtƌateƌƌitoƌial huŵaŶ ƌights aŶd 
environmental abuses committed by their offshore affiliates͛. See also Curran, n. 60 above, at 415-422.  
70 J.F. “heƌŵaŶ, ͚“hould a PaƌeŶt CoŵpaŶǇ Take a HaŶds-off Approach to the Human Rights Risks of its 
“uďsidiaƌies?͛ (2018) 19(1) Business Law International, pp. 23-36, at 28. 
71 Okpabi and Others v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Another [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC), 26 January 2017 (Okpabi, 
2017); Okpabi and others v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd 
[2018] EWCA Civ 191 (Okpabi, 2018). 
72 Another case that arose under very similar circumstances is The Bodo Community and others v. Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC). In that case, however, the claims 
proceeded against the subsidiary on the sole basis of an agreement that it would voluntarily submit to the 
jurisdiction and admit responsibility for the pollution. 
73 Okpabi, 2018, para. 1. 
74 Okpabi, 2017, paras 113-116, 119. 
75 Okpabi 2018, para. 134. 
76 A similar conclusion was reached in a non-environmental case AAA v. Unilever Plc [2017] EWHC 371 (QB). 
The case was brought by victims of ethnic violence in Kenya following the general elections, when groups 
of attackers invaded the tea plantation operated by the Kenyan subsidiary of an English-based company, 
killing, raping and physically assaulting the workers. The Court of Appeal dismissed the claim against the 
parent company thus preventing the claimants from asserting jurisdiction against the subsidiary company 
in England. 
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approach for the imposition of the duty of care on English-domiciled parent companies in relation 
to the oǀeƌseas aĐtiǀities of theiƌ suďsidiaƌies͛ as ǁell as foƌ imposing ͚aŶ uŶƌeasoŶaďlǇ high 
burden on the claimants to establish an arguable case on the duty of care at the jurisdictional 
stage of pƌoĐeediŶgs͛.77 As of March 2020, the case was pending in the Supreme Court. 
So far, however, none of the English cases involving a paƌeŶt ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s dutǇ of Đaƌe have been 
decided on the merits. Nonetheless, Vedanta confirmed that English parent companies could owe 
a duty of care to foreign claimants affected by operations of their subsidiaries in the host states 
and that the English courts could have jurisdiction to hear such cases even when a foreign court 
is seemingly a more appropriate place for the trial. This development also reflects a growing trend 
of home state courts agreeing to hear claims against the parent companies and their foreign 
subsidiaries and, even more importantly, holding the parent companies liable in some of these 
cases.78 The most notable example of this trend is Akpan v. Shell where the Dutch courts held that 
they had jurisdiction over the claims brought by Nigerian citizens against the RDS and SPDC for 
oil spills from an oil well operated by the latter.79 Overall, this might well be considered part of a 
broader global trend towards corporate liability for various harms, including human rights 
violations.80  
At the same time, this trend contrasts with the developments in the United States (US), which 
may seem a particularly lucrative jurisdiction when it comes to transnational liability claims 
against corporations.81 The US is home state to a vast number of the ǁoƌld͛s laƌgest MNCs, its 
legal system allows the pursuit of different avenues of claims in federal or state courts,82 while 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),83 a provision unique to the US which explicitly grants US courts 
jurisdiction to hear civil cases brought by non-US nationals for torts committed in violation of 
 
77 E. Aƌistoǀa, ͚Toƌt LitigatioŶ agaiŶst TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Coƌporations in the English Courts: The Challenge of 
JuƌisdiĐtioŶ͛ (2018) 14(2) Utrecht Law Review, pp. 6-21, at 16. 
78 See the discussion on the relevant case law in Curran, n. 60 above, at 434-444.  
79 Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, ECLI: NL: RBSGR: 2013: BY9854 (District Court the Hague, 2013,); Dooh v. 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC, ECL-NL: GHDHA: 2015:3586 (Court of Appeal the Hague, 17 December 2015,). 
Notably, in its ruling, the Dutch courts made multiple references to the English case-law. For a broader 
discussion on this case see N. Jćgeƌs, K. Jesse & J. VeƌsĐhuuƌeŶ, ͚The Futuƌe of Coƌpoƌate LiaďilitǇ foƌ Eǆtƌa 
teƌƌitoƌial HuŵaŶ ‘ights Aďuses: The DutĐh Case AgaiŶst “hell͛ (2013) 107 AJIL Unbound, pp. e36-e41; M. 
Weller & A. Pato, ͚LoĐal PaƌeŶts as ͚Anchor DefeŶdaŶts͛ iŶ EuƌopeaŶ Courts for Claims against their Foreign 
Subsidiaries in Human Rights and Environmental Damages Litigation: Recent Case Law and Legislative 
TƌeŶds͛ (2018) 23(2) Uniform Law Review, pp. 397-417. 
80 See, for example, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in non-environmental case Nevsun 
Resources Ltd v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, concerning Eritrean workers' forced labour in a mine owned by a 
Canadian company and confirming that corporations are not immune from direct liability for human rights 
violations under customary international law: ͚it is Ŷot ͞plaiŶ aŶd oďǀious͟ that ĐoƌpoƌatioŶs todaǇ eŶjoǇ a 
ďlaŶket eǆĐlusioŶ uŶdeƌ ĐustoŵaƌǇ iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ fƌoŵ diƌeĐt liaďilitǇ foƌ ǀiolatioŶs of ͞oďligatory, 
defiŶaďle, aŶd uŶiǀeƌsal Ŷoƌŵs of iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͟, oƌ iŶdiƌeĐt liaďilitǇ foƌ theiƌ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ […] 
͞ĐoŵpliĐitǇ offeŶses͛͟ ;paƌa. ϭϭϯͿ. 
81 See C.A. WhǇtoĐk, ͚The EǀolǀiŶg Foƌuŵ “hoppiŶg “Ǉsteŵ͛ (2011) 96(3) Cornell Law Review, pp. 481-534, 
at 490-497 (discussing the advantages that foreign claimants could traditionally enjoy by perusing 
transnational litigation in US courts). 
82 See, for example, S. Baughen, Human Rights and Corporate Wrongs: Closing the Governance Gap (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 54-59, 78-80, 152-171. 
83 Ϯϴ U.“.C. § ϭϯϱϬ. 
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customary international law or treaties ratified by the US,84 appears to fill an extremely important 
and broad legislative gap. 
These lucrative possibilities, however, very rarely materialize in reality. The application of ATS has 
been subject to restrictive interpretation by the US Supreme Court, limiting the jurisdiction of the 
US courts when dealing with transnational claims brought under this act. In Kiobel v. Shell, which 
concerns widespread human rights violations carried out by the Nigerian military and supported 
by Shell against Ogoni people who were protesting against environmental pollution caused by 
SPDC,85 the US Supreme Court ƌuled that the Đlaiŵ did Ŷot ͚touĐh aŶd ĐoŶĐeƌŶ the teƌƌitoƌǇ of the 
[US] ǁith suffiĐieŶt foƌĐe͛ aŶd ͚ŵeƌe Đoƌpoƌate pƌeseŶĐe͛ of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ iŶ the U“ ǁas 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction.86 
The US Supreme Court placed an even greater restriction to the application of the ATS to claims 
against foreign entities in a recent non-environmental case, Jesner v. Arab Bank,87 which expressly 
excludes foreign companies from ATS liability on political grounds.88 The Court did not address 
the question whether this exclusion also applies to US companies,89 which is highly relevant with 
 
84 See S.P. Mulligan, The Alien Tort Statute (ATS): A Primer (1 June 2018), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44947/4, at 1. Notably, while the US Supreme Court held 
that ͚ the AT“ is a juƌisdiĐtioŶal statute ĐƌeatiŶg Ŷo Ŷeǁ Đauses of aĐtioŶ͛, it ĐoŶsideƌed that iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ Ŷaƌƌoǁ 
circumstances courts may recognize a common law cause of action for claims based on contemporary 
international law. See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-725 (2004). 
85 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 US 108 (2013). Directly related to these circumstances was Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 226 F 3d 88 (2d Cir 2000), brought by the family of the executed Ogoni activist 
Ken Saro-Wiwa under ATS against RDS and SPDC. In 2009, RDS agreed to pay $15.5 million to settle the 
case. Similar circumstances occurred in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010), which was 
also brought under the ATS and dismissed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Bowoto, a 
group of Nigerian citizens protesting against the environmental damage caused by Chevron Nigeria Ltd, a 
subsidiary of the US-based oil company Chevron, were attacked by Nigerian military, allegedly hired by 
Chevron to suppress the protests. The claimants did not pursue claims against the subsidiary company. 
86 Kiobel, at 125. It has been observed that this formulation left more questions than answers and led to 
conflicting interpretations by the lower courts. See, for example, R.P. Alfoƌd, ͚The Futuƌe of HuŵaŶ ‘ights 
LitigatioŶ Afteƌ Kioďel͛ (2014) 89(4) Notre Dame Law Review, pp. 1749-1772, at 1754 (referring to the 
deĐisioŶ as ͚Đoŵpleǆ aŶd ĐoŶfusiŶg, offeƌiŶg scant guidance as to how lower courts should proceed when 
Đlaiŵs touĐh aŶd ĐoŶĐeƌŶ U.“. teƌƌitoƌǇ͛Ϳ; Foƌ a disĐussioŶ of diffeƌeŶt iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs see: Note, ͚ClaƌifǇiŶg 
Kioďel's TouĐh aŶd CoŶĐeƌŶ Test͛ (2017) 130(7) Harvard Law Review, pp. 1902-1923. This decision did not 
put aŶ eŶd to the ĐlaiŵaŶts͛ atteŵpts to hold “hell aĐĐouŶtaďle, as theǇ haǀe suďseƋueŶtlǇ puƌsued 
litigation in the Netherlands, where it may have better prospects of success – see Claimants v. Royal Dutch 
Shell Plc and others, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2019:6670 (the Hague District Court, 2019), holding that Dutch courts 
have jurisdiction to hear the claims (paras 4.23-4.29). 
87 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). The lawsuit was brought by non-US victims of terrorist 
attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza and their families, alleging that Arab Bank aided and abetted the 
terrorist groups in the Middle East by transferring funds to their accounts, including transactions passing 
thƌough the ďaŶk͛s offiĐes iŶ Neǁ Yoƌk CitǇ. 
88 The court held that ͚aŶǇ iŵpositioŶ of Đoƌpoƌate liaďilitǇ oŶ foƌeigŶ ĐoƌpoƌatioŶs foƌ ǀiolatioŶs of 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ ŵust ďe deteƌŵiŶed iŶ the fiƌst iŶstaŶĐe ďǇ the politiĐal ďƌaŶĐhes of the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ ;at 
1408).  
89 IŶstead, the U“ “upƌeŵe Couƌt ŵade the folloǁiŶg oďseƌǀatioŶ: ͚BeĐause this Đase iŶǀolǀes a foƌeigŶ 
corporation, we have no need to reach the question whether an alien may sue a United States corporation 
under the ATS. And since such a suit may generally be brought in federal court based on diversity 
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regard to certain types of extraterritorial environmental harms caused by US companies on US 
soil – most notably, contribution to climate change.90 However, in terms of the foreign 
subsidiaries of US companies, Jesner seems to foreclose the possibility of suit under the ATS, 
unless the claimants convince the courts that the parent companies are directly liable for the 
conduct of the subsidiaries.91 Still, even in the latter scenario, claimants would likely find it difficult 
to succeed due to the reluctance of the US courts to pierce the corporate veil.92  
A restrictive approach of the US courts to extraterritorial claims is observable in non-ATS cases as 
well, where the courts can refuse to exercise jurisdiction over claims related to the responsibility 
of the US transnational companies for their activities abroad on various grounds.93 A notable 
example of this trend are two high-profile environmental cases concerning large-scale pollution 
originating from subsidiaries of US-based companies in India94 and Ecuador and Peru,95 
respectively, dismissed by the US courts on forum non conveniens grounds despite compelling 
evidence that courts in these countries were not adequately prepared to process these cases.96 
In dismissing the abovementioned cases on procedural grounds, the US courts seemed to adhere 
more to political reasons97 than to considerations of justice. While these developments do not 
necessarily mean that transnational environmental and human rights claims in the US have 
reached a dead end,98 they may indeed render the EŶglish, the DutĐh aŶd otheƌ ŶatioŶs͛ Đouƌts, 
 
juƌisdiĐtioŶ, Ϯϴ U.“.C.§ ϭϯϯϮ;aͿ;ϮͿ, it is uŶĐleaƌ ǁhǇ AT“ juƌisdiĐtioŶ ǁould ďe Ŷeeded iŶ that situatioŶ͛. 
Jesner, at 1410 (note*).  
90 M. DelliŶgeƌ, ͚Post-Jesner Climate Change Lawsuits Under the Alien Tort Statute͛ ;ϮϬϭϵͿ ϰϰ;“Ϳ Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 241-297, at 269. For a discussion on the prospective transnational 
climate change liability claims brought by foreign claimants directly against the US private emitters in the 
US courts or in their home state courts see M. BǇeƌs, K. FƌaŶks & A. Gage, ͚The IŶteƌŶatioŶalizatioŶ of 
Cliŵate Daŵages LitigatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ ϳ;ϮͿ Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, pp. 264-319. 
Corporate climate change liability will be discussed in more detail in the next part of this article. 
91 W.“. Dodge, ͚Coƌpoƌate LiaďilitǇ UŶdeƌ the U“ AlieŶ Toƌt “tatute: A CoŵŵeŶt oŶ JesŶeƌ ǀ. Aƌaď BaŶk͛ 
(2019) 4(1) Business and Human Rights Journal, pp. 131-137, at 135. 
92 Ibid. 
93 For example, political question, sovereign immunity, comity, forum non conveniens, etc. Baughen, at 59-
80. See also P.K. BookŵaŶ, ͚LitigatioŶ IsolatioŶisŵ͛ (2015) 67(5) Stanford Law Review, pp. 1081-1144. 
94 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
For a discussion of this case see U. Baǆi, ͚WƌitiŶg aďout IŵpuŶitǇ aŶd EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt: The “ilǀeƌ Juďilee' of 
the 
Bhopal Catastƌophe͛ (2010) 1(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, pp. 23-44. 
95 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). For a discussion of this case see Yilmaz Vastardis and 
Chambers, n. 65 above, at 407-411. 
96 “ee H. ǀaŶ LooŶ, ͚PƌiŶĐiples aŶd BuildiŶg BloĐks foƌ a Gloďal Legal Fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Ciǀil 
LitigatioŶ iŶ EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal Matteƌs͛ ;ϮϬϭϴͿ Ϯϯ;ϮͿ Uniform Law Review, pp. 298-318, at 309; See also C. Liu, 
͚EsĐapiŶg LiaďilitǇ ǀia Foƌuŵ NoŶ CoŶǀeŶieŶs: CoŶoĐoPhillips's Oil “pill iŶ ChiŶa͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϭϳ;ϮͿ University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change, pp. 137-174. 
97 See, for example, W.W. Heiseƌ, ͚Foƌuŵ Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying 
Foreign Law in Transnational Tort AĐtioŶs͛ (2005) 51(3) Wayne Law Review, pp. 1161-1192, at 1170; E.A. 
PosŶeƌ & C.‘. “uŶsteiŶ, ͚ ChevroniziŶg FoƌeigŶ ‘elatioŶs Laǁ͛ (2007) 116(6) Yale Law Journal, pp. 1170-1229; 
W.“. Dodge, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal CoŵitǇ iŶ AŵeƌiĐaŶ Laǁ͛ (2015) 115(8) Columbia Law Review, pp. 2071-2142. 
98 See Grear & Weston, n. 67 above, at 37, arguing that the outcome in Kiobel ͚stƌeŶgtheŶs the ƌatioŶales 
for paying attention to non-[ATS] strategies͛. AŶ eǆaŵple of a ŵoƌe suĐĐessful outĐoŵe iŶ ŶoŶ-ATS 
transnational environmental litigation is Jam et al. v. International Finance Corp. 139 S.Ct. 759 (2019), 
recently addressed by the US Supreme Court, where a group of farmers and fishermen from India sued the 
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which have demonstrated their willingness to hear such claims, a more attractive forum for 
transnational litigation against MNCs in the long term.99  
 
4. Implications for potential climate change liability claims 
Apart from claims concerning corporate liability for conventional environmental damage, 
Vedanta is also potentially relevant for prospective claims against English mining, fossil fuel 
producing companies and other companies and their foreign subsidiaries for their contribution to 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and, consequently, climate change. In Okpabi, the Court 
of Appeals referred to the duty to ͚reduce global warming͛ as an ͚abstract […] concep[t] of moral 
responsibility͛ as distinguishable from a ͚duty owed to a particular person or class of persons.͛100 
Such a definition, however, appears to ignore the fact that the government’s duty to address 
climate change, has already been recognized by a number of foreign courts, including by the US 
Supreme Court,101 the Supreme Court of Colombia,102 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands,103 
and lower courts in other countries around the world.104 Notably, a governmental duty of care 
with regard to climate change is fairly obvious as the cause of action stems from both national 
and international law requirements for states to address climate change.105 Similar developments 
 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) for inadequate supervision of the construction of a coal-fired power 
plant in the state of Gujarat, India. The IFC maintained that it was immune from suit under the 1945 
International Organizations Immunities Act and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The US Supreme 
Court held that the Act does not grant absolute immunity from suit to international organizations. Notably, 
though, in Jam the defendant was not a private company but an international organization with 184 
member countries, including the US and India.  
99 See, for example, Bookman, n. 93 above, at 1116 (noting that the U“ ͚ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ pƌesumptively plaintiffs' 
faǀoƌite foƌuŵ͛ aŶd that ͚seĐuƌities, eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal, aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights litigatioŶ pƌoǀide eǆaŵples of tǇpes 
of litigatioŶ that aƌe gƌaduallǇ ŵigƌatiŶg aďƌoad͛Ϳ.  
100 Okpabi 2018, para. 88. 
101 Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The Supreme Court held that the US Environmental 
Protection Agency abdicated its responsibility under the federal air quality legislation to regulate 
automobile GHG emissions. 
102 Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment, STC4360 (2018). The claimants successfully 
ĐhalleŶged the ColoŵďiaŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŶaĐtioŶ ǁith ƌegaƌd to defoƌestatioŶ iŶ the AŵazoŶ ƌegioŶ, that, 
according to the claimants, greatly contributed to the total volume of GHG emissions in the country and 
therefore, climate change. 
103 The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 (2019). The court held that 
the state was breaching its duty of care by failing to pursue more ambitious GHG reduction targets. See J. 
ǀaŶ )eďeŶ, ͚EstaďlishiŶg a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn 
the Tide?͛ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ϰ;ϮͿ Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 339-57; and B. Mayer, The State of the 
Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018) (2019) 
8(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 167-92. 
104 See “. VaƌǀastiaŶ, ͚The HuŵaŶ ‘ight to a CleaŶ aŶd HealthǇ EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt iŶ Cliŵate ChaŶge LitigatioŶ͛ 
(2019) 2019(09) Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research 
Paper, pp. 1-18. 
105 See, e.g., A.-J. “aigeƌ, ͚DoŵestiĐ Couƌts aŶd the Paƌis AgƌeeŵeŶt͛s Cliŵate Goals: The Need foƌ a 
Coŵpaƌatiǀe AppƌoaĐh͛ ;ϮϬϮϬͿ ϵ;ϭͿ Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 37-54. 
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are potentially possible in case of private emitters,106 although determining the scope of their 
liability may be more difficult.  
For instance, in the US case American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut107 brought by a group of 
states against several electric power corporations that owned and operated fossil fuel-fired 
powerplants across the US, the Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air Act, granting the 
US Environmental Protection Agency the power to set emission standards (following the Supreme 
Couƌt͛s deĐisioŶ iŶ Massachusetts), displaces federal common law nuisance claims for domestic 
GHG emissions. In another US case Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.108 where an 
Inupiat Eskimo village of Kivalina in Alaska sought to recover money damages related to its forced 
relocation due to the erosion of sea ice around the village from a group of the ǁoƌld͛s laƌgest 
fossil fuel producers, the Ninth Circuit expanded this displacement rule to cover claims for 
daŵages ďased oŶ oil pƌoduĐeƌs͛ past emissions. Nonetheless, the outcome in these early US 
cases is not necessarily indicative of impending developments both in the US and elsewhere, and 
some examples below suggest that such claims could potentially go beyond the procedural stage, 
with the decision in Vedanta opening some interesting new perspectives.  
First and foremost, a likely catalyst for a surge in climate change liability claims against private 
emitters are the recent studies tracing GHG emissions to corporate entities producing fossil fuels, 
including several English MNCs.109 Hence, following two early high-profile cases against BP (one 
of the largest corporate contributors to global carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial 
Revolution) in the US,110 in recent years the company has faced a cascade of lawsuits brought by 
US cities and municipalities seeking compensation for climate change adaptation measures in the 
US courts, relying on the abovementioned GHG emissions tracing studies.111 Notably, these 
 
106 See G. GaŶgulǇ, J. “etzeƌ & V. HeǇǀaeƌt, ͚If at fiƌst You DoŶ͛t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate 
ChaŶge͛ (2018) 38(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp: 841-868. 
107 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 429 (2011). 
108 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856-858 (9th Cir. 2012). 
109 See: R. Heede, ͚ TƌaĐiŶg Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement 
Producers, 1854–ϮϬϭϬ͛ (2014) 122(1-2) Climatic Change, pp: 229-241. See also Climate Accountability 
Institute, https://climateaccountability.org/index.html, for updated reports ďased oŶ Heede͛s studǇ. 
110 BP, alongside other major fossil fuel producers, was sued by property owners in Mississippi who claimed 
the ĐoŵpaŶies͛ GHG eŵissioŶs ĐoŶtƌiďuted to gloďal ǁaƌŵiŶg aŶd theƌefoƌe to a ƌise iŶ sea leǀel that added 
to the feƌoĐitǇ of HuƌƌiĐaŶe KatƌiŶa, ultiŵatelǇ ĐausiŶg ŵassiǀe daŵage to ĐlaiŵaŶts͛ pƌopeƌtǇ. “ee Comer 
v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F.3d 849 (S.D. Miss. 
2012). Similarly, BP and other fossil fuel producers were defendants in the abovementioned case Kivalina. 
Both lawsuits were dismissed on procedural grounds. 
111 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c & Others 388 F.Supp.3d 538 (D. Maryland 2019) (dismissing 
the aƌguŵeŶt that the ͚CitǇ's Đlaiŵs ͞iŶtƌude upoŶ ďoth foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ aŶd ĐaƌefullǇ ďalaŶĐed ƌegulatoƌǇ 
ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs at the ŶatioŶal leǀel, iŶĐludiŶg the foƌeigŶ affaiƌs doĐtƌiŶe͛͟ ďeĐause the ͚defeŶdaŶts [did] 
not actually identify any foreign policy that [was] implicated by the City's claims. The case was appealed, 
including the defendants motions to have it removed to a federal court; in March 2020, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed it to stay in state court); City of New York v. BP p.l.c. & Others 325 
F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D. New York 2018) (the claim was against the parent company only. The court held that 
͚to eǆteŶt that ĐitǇ ǁas seekiŶg to hold ĐoŵpaŶies liaďle foƌ daŵages steŵŵiŶg, Ŷot just fƌoŵ domestic, 
ďut fƌoŵ foƌeigŶ gƌeeŶhouse gas eŵissioŶs, ĐitǇ͛s Đlaiŵs ǁeƌe ďaƌƌed ďǇ pƌesuŵptioŶ agaiŶst 
eǆtƌateƌƌitoƌialitǇ aŶd Ŷeed foƌ judiĐial ĐautioŶ iŶ faĐe of seƌious foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͛. As of MaƌĐh 
2020, the case was under appeal in the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); King County v. BP p.l.c. 
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lawsuits focus not on the defendants own GHG emissions (as in American Electric Power Co. and 
Kivalina), but rather on their sale of fossil fuels to those who eventually burn them.112 BP is also 
under investigation in the Philippines for the potential human rights violations resulting from 
climate change, with petitioners referring to the same studies.113 The investigation culminated in 
the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶt duƌiŶg UN climate negotiations in Madrid in December 2019, 
that based on the existing evidence, Carbon Majors could be found liable for human rights 
violations arising from climate change.114  
Unlike the claims against the governments, such claims typically deploy compensation strategies, 
focussing on harms caused by allegedly tortious activities of private polluters.115 However, the 
circumstances in the abovementioned proceedings are quite different from Vedanta where the 
pollution was local and KCM was the only identifiable polluter. Meanwhile, climate change 
liability claims concern GHG emissions – pollution of exceptionally diffuse nature, caused by 
countless sources, and the causal chain between individual emissions and their contribution to 
climate change (particularly, extreme weather events attributed to it) is still not fully explored.116 
As a result, claims against corporate emitters will most likely face formidable challenges, given ͚a 
long latency period, diffuse harms affecting multiple victims, and diffuse origins from multiple 
toƌtfeasoƌs͛.117 Unsurprisingly, both BP and other non-US companies used this argument to 
challenge the lawsuits as well as the jurisdiction of the US courts since these companies are not 
 
& Others WL 4385447 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (the claim was against the parent company only. The court 
granted one of the defendants – RDS – motion to dismiss the claims against it due to the lack of jurisdiction); 
City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. & Others 325 F.Supp.3d 1017 (N.D. California 2018) (dismissing the claims on 
separation of powers and foreign policy grounds. As of March 2020, the case was under appeal in the Ninth 
Circuit); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp. & Others 393 F.Supp.3d 142 (D. Rhode Island 2019) (dismissing the 
argument that the foreign-affairs doctrine completely preempts the State's claims. As of March 2020, the 
case was under appeal in the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit); Lawsuit City & County of Honolulu 
v. Sunoco LP & Others 1CCV-20-0000380 (Hawai'i Cir.Ct., filed in 2020).  
112 See, for example, City of New York, at 473; City of Oakland, at 1024. 
113 Republic of the Philippines Commission on Human Rights In Re: National Inquiry on the Impact of Climate 
Change on the Human Rights of the Filipino People aŶd the ‘espoŶsiďilitǇ theƌefoƌ, if aŶǇ, of the ͞CaƌďoŶ 
Majoƌs͟, Case No: CHR-NI-2016-0001, Memorandum for the Petitioners, 19 September 2019. 
114 CIEL, ͚Groundbreaking Inquiry in Philippines Links Carbon Majors to Human Rights Impacts of Climate 
Change, Calls for Greater Accountability͛ (9 December 2019), available at 
https://www.ciel.org/news/groundbreaking-inquiry-in-philippines-links-carbon-majors-to-human-rights-
impacts-of-climate-change-calls-for-greater-accountability/. The Commission, however, is not a judicial 
body and its primary functions are investigatory and advisory. See A. “aǀaƌesi & J. Auz, ͚Cliŵate ChaŶge 
Litigation aŶd HuŵaŶ ‘ights: PushiŶg the BouŶdaƌies͛ ;ϮϬϭϵͿ ϵ;ϯͿ Climate Law, pp. 244-262, at 259-261. 
115 However, claims against private emitters, following the model of litigation against the governments and 
demanding companies to substantially reduce their GHG emissions, are also starting to emerge. See nn 
126-127 below. 
116 See, for example, P.A. “tott et al., ͚AttƌiďutioŶ of Eǆtƌeŵe Weatheƌ aŶd Cliŵate‐ƌelated EǀeŶts͛ ϮϬϭϲ 
7(1) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, pp. 23-ϰϭ, at ϯϬ; “. MaƌjaŶaĐ & L. PattoŶ, ͚Eǆtƌeŵe 
Weather Event Attribution Science and Climate Change Litigation: An Essential Step in the Causal ChaiŶ?͛ 
(2018) 36(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, pp. 265-298.  
117 J. Todd, ͚A ͞“eŶse of EƋuitǇ͟ iŶ EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal JustiĐe LitigatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϮϬͿ ϰϰ;ϭͿ Haƌǀaƌd EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal 
Law Review, pp. 169–233, at 181. See also D.A. KǇsaƌ, ͚What Climate Change Can Do about Tort Laǁ͛ (2011) 
41(1) Environmental Law, pp. 1-71. 
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incorporated in the states where they were sued.118 The argument that the abovementioned 
companies are not present in the US can be refuted fairly easily as demonstrated by the court in 
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.: 
BP does Ŷot opeƌate iŶ CalifoƌŶia ďut seǀeƌal of BP͛s suďsidiaƌies do. These suďsidiaƌies pƌoduĐe 
oil and natural gas in California, own or operate port facilities in California to receive crude oil, ship 
crude oil from Alaska to California, license the ARCO trademark to gasoline stations in California, 
and promote gasoline sales through credit card offers and gasoline discounts. Elsewhere in the 
United States, BP subsidiaries produce fossil fuels, own refineries and pipelines, and market 
gasoline through BP-branded stores.119  
Meanwhile, other challenges outlined above are typically countered by the findings in the 
aďoǀeŵeŶtioŶed studies tƌaĐiŶg the lioŶ͛s shaƌe of Đuŵulative worldwide GHG emissions to just 
90 corporate entities (the so-Đalled ͚ĐaƌďoŶ ŵajoƌs͛Ϳ120 and the developments in attribution 
science, quantifying the anthropogenic climate change and related impacts121 as well as the 
evidence on deliberate public misinformation about the connection between burning of fossil 
fuels and climate change, perpetrated by the defendants.122 The precedential value of other types 
of environmental or public health litigation (especially, tobacco) against companies where 
claimants faced similar challenges is rightly pointed out as a strong argument supporting such 
liability claims against corporate emitters.123 
Although it is yet to be determined how courts will treat all these findings in the context of 
corporate climate change liability, the experience from similar litigation abroad indicates that 
there is a possibility for such claims to go into evidentiary phase. For example, in German case 
Lliuya v. RWE AG,124 the claim was brought by a Peruvian citizen against a Germany-based energy 
company RWE in the District Court of Essen, asking to reimburse climate change adaptation costs 
iŶ the ĐlaiŵaŶt͛s ǀillage iŶ Peƌu. The Đouƌt disŵissed the Đlaiŵ foƌ laĐk of ĐausalitǇ, ďut on the 
appeal, the Higher State Court of Hamm reversed this decision, allowing the case to move forward 
 
118 See, for example, Comer (2012), at 849; City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C. No. C 17-06011 WHA and No. C 17-
06011 WHA (N.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction), at 5; King 
County v. BP p.l.c. at 9. 
119 City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., n. 118 above, at 2. 
120 An important point here is that half of the emissions has been produced since 1986 (see Heede, n. 109 
above, at 234); by that time, major fossil fuel companies were already aware about the risks associated 
with fossil fuel production and use (see n. 3 above). 
121 “ee D. MitĐhell et al., ͚AttƌiďutiŶg Human Mortality During Extreme Heat Waves to Anthropogenic 
Climate ChaŶge͛ ;ϮϬϭϲͿ ϭϭ;ϳͿ Environmental Research Letters, pp. 1-8; B. Ekǁuƌzel et al. ͚The Rise in Global 
Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon PƌoduĐeƌs͛ 
(2017) 144(4) Climatic Change, pp. 579-590; ‘. LiĐkeƌ et al., ͚ AttƌiďutiŶg OĐeaŶ AĐidifiĐatioŶ to Majoƌ CaƌďoŶ 
PƌoduĐeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϭϵͿ ϭϰ(12) Environmental Research Letters, pp. 1-14. For a comprehensive assessment of 
how climate change contribution science can be used in litigation see M. Burger, R. Horton & J. WeŶtz, ͚The 
Laǁ aŶd “ĐieŶĐe of Cliŵate ChaŶge AttƌiďutioŶ͛ (2020) 45(1) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 
57-240. 
122 See n. 3 above. 
123 See, for example, Ganguly, Setzer & Heyvaert, n. 106 above, at 856-858. See also M. Olszynski, S. 
MasĐheƌ & M. Doelle, ͚Fƌoŵ “ŵokes to “ŵokestaĐks: LessoŶs fƌoŵ Tobacco for the Future of Climate 
ChaŶge LiaďilitǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ ϯϬ;ϭͿ Georgetown Environmental Law Review, pp. 1-45. 
124 Lliuya v. RWE AG, 2O 285/15 (VG Essen, 2016). 
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into the evidentiary phase.125 This stage iŶǀolǀes the Đouƌt ƌeǀieǁiŶg eǆpeƌt opiŶioŶ oŶ the ‘WE͛s 
emissions and their contribution to climate change, including its impact on the claimant. An even 
more recent example is Smith v. Fronterra Co-Operative Group Limited126 in New Zealand, where 
a ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe of iŶdigeŶous Māoƌi ĐoŵŵuŶities sued seven national companies that operate 
dairy farms, a power station, and an oil refinery and significantly contribute to GHG emissions in 
the country.127 The court, while rejecting the public nuisance and negligence claims, allowed the 
case to proceed to the trial, underscoring that its novel nature rendered it to be addressed on the 
merits.128 Neither of the two cases involve the parent-subsidiary relationship although their 
procedural significance is still very relevant.129  
Furthermore, as seen from the recent legal action initiated by the French branch of the 
environmental NGO Friends of the Earth against French fossil fuel MNC Total SA, challenging a 
large-scale oil project in Uganda operated by its local subsidiary,130 climate change liability claims 
against the operations of MNCs in the host state though foreign subsidiaries are also becoming 
an issue for home state courts to address. The French case is particularly interesting as, under 
FƌaŶĐe͛s corporate duty of vigilance law, large French companies are obliged to publish annual 
plans that address the adverse impact of their activities, and those of subsidiaries and suppliers, 
on people and the environment.131 Although FƌaŶĐe͛s dutǇ of Đaƌe legislatioŶ is Ƌuite uŶiƋue in 
the global corporate liability landscape, with climate change liability litigation experiencing a 
dramatic expansion in the last several years,132 it may just be a matter of time before such claims 
become widespread.  
IŶ that ƌegaƌd, the “upƌeŵe Couƌt͛s deĐisioŶ iŶ Vedanta offers an interesting opportunity, which 
is directly linked to the diffuse nature of GHG pollution and its cumulative effect. Foreign 
subsidiaries of the major emitting companies can produce significant emissions in the host states 
 
125 Lliuya v. RWE AG, 1-5 U 15/17 (Landgericht Essen, 2017). 
126 Smith v. Fronterra Co-Operative Group Limited & Others [2020] NZHC 419 (High Court of New Zealand). 
127 Notably, unlike in most other cases against fossil fuel companies, the claimant in this case is not seeking 
damages and instead, is requesting the court to have each defendant achieve net zero emissions by 2030 
Ibid., paras 12-17. Another similar case, Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc., initiated by a group 
of Dutch NGOs against RDS in April 2019 is currently pending in the Hague district court. 
128 Smith, para. 103:  
I am reluctant to conclude that the recognition of a new tortious duty which makes corporates 
responsible to the public for their emissions, is untenable. [I]t may be that a novel claim such as 
that filed by Mr Smith could result in the further evolution of the law of tort. It may, for example, 
be that the special damage rule in public nuisance could be modified; it may be that climate change 
science will lead to an increased ability to model the possible effects of emissions. These are issues 
which can only properly be explored at trial. I am not prepared to strike out the third cause of 
action and foreclose on the possibility of the law of tort recognising a new duty which might assist 
Mr Smith.  
129 For a discussion on the relevance of this case to the English law see V. Kumar & W. FƌaŶk, ͚ HoldiŶg Pƌiǀate 
Emitters to Account for the Effects of Climate Change: Could a Case Like Lliuya Succeed under English 
NuisaŶĐe Laǁs?͛ (2018) 12(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 110-123. 
130 Information about the action is available at https://www.totalincourt.org/?s=amisdelaterre. 
131 See Palombo, n. 69 above, at 275-6. 
132 Though not necessarily involving the parent/subsidiary relationship and concerning different types of 
businesses. 
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yet the host states themselves may still not be large scale emitters globally.133 Hence, even if the 
host states͛ Đouƌts were to hold these emissions by the subsidiaries negligible in the face of global 
emissions,134 the cumulative emissions of both the subsidiaries and their parent companies would 
likely be considerably higher, with their quantity and even approximated impacts much more 
palpable and calculable because of the abovementioned attribution studies. In practice, this 
means that claims against the subsidiaries (smaller emitters) alone could be less effective, as 
demonstrated in Smith, where the court expressed concern that since tortious liability is generally 
joint and several, it makes any defendant against whom a claim is made potentially ͚liable for the 
ǁhole of a plaiŶtiff͛s loss, ŶotǁithstaŶdiŶg the iŶdiǀidual defeŶdaŶts͛ ŵiŶiŵal ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the 
global emissions that, combined, have caused climate change͛.135 Therefore, a prospective claim 
agaiŶst ďoth the foƌeigŶ suďsidiaƌǇ aŶd the paƌeŶt ĐoŵpaŶǇ ďƌought iŶ the paƌeŶt ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s 
home state could be more viable.136  
Admittedly, such an approach would still not eliminate all the challenges. For example, in Smith, 
the Đouƌt hǇpothesized that ͚[ƌ]ecognising the duty claimed would give rise to issues of 
indeterminate liability on anyone͛ aŶd ͚the class of potential defendants is equally open-
ended͛.137 The court in Oakland reasoned along very similar lines:  
While these actions are brought against the first, second, fourth, sixth and ninth largest producers 
of fossil fuels, anyone who supplied fossil fuels with knowledge of the problem would be liable. 
[…] Everyone has contributed to the problem of global warming and everyone will suffer the 
consequences.138 
Of course, it would be wrong to view these challenges as insurmountable; for example, climate 
change is recognized to be disproportionately affecting developing countries as well as vulnerable 
communities in the developed countries, whose contribution to global emissions is far lower than 
 
133 This is especially true in case of countries with a significant presence of foreign fossil fuel corporations, 
including Nigeria and the Philippines. See Heede, n. 109 above, at 231. 
134 The alleged negligible contribution to cumulative emissions is a common argument in climate change 
litigation; it was refuted by both the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Urgenda, para. 5.7.8 (ruling that 
͚[t]he defence that a duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on the part of the individual states does not 
help because other countries will continue their emissions cannot be accepted […]: no reduction is 
negligible͛, aŶd the U“ “upƌeŵe Couƌt iŶ Massachusetts, at 525-526 (holding that the existence of other 
major GHG emitters like China and India, should not preclude the US agency from its regulatory duty, 
ďeĐause ͚[a] ƌeduĐtioŶ iŶ doŵestiĐ eŵissioŶs ǁould sloǁ the paĐe of gloďal eŵissioŶs iŶĐƌeases, Ŷo ŵatteƌ 
ǁhat happeŶs elseǁheƌe͛Ϳ. “oŵe otheƌ Đouƌts, however, have ruled differently. For a discussion see S. 
VaƌǀastiaŶ, ͚AĐĐess to JustiĐe iŶ Cliŵate ChaŶge LitigatioŶ fƌoŵ a TƌaŶsŶatioŶal PeƌspeĐtiǀe: Pƌiǀate PaƌtǇ 
Standing in Recent Climate Cases͛, in J. JeŶdƌośka & M. Bar (eds), Procedural Environmental Rights: Principle 
X of the Rio Declaration in Theory and Practice (Intersentia, 2017) pp. 481-502. 
135 Smith, para. 98. 
136 The fact that such lawsuits could be brought by those affected by climate change in the developing world 
raises, among other things, the question of climate justice. See J. Peel & J. LiŶ, ͚TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Cliŵate 
LitigatioŶ: The CoŶtƌiďutioŶ of the Gloďal “outh͛ ;ϮϬϭϵͿ ϭϭϯ;ϮͿ American Journal of International Law, pp. 
679-726, at 681; J. Setzer & L. BeŶjaŵiŶ, ͚Climate Litigation in the Global South: Constraints and 
IŶŶoǀatioŶs͛ (2020) 9(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 77-101. 
137 Smith, para. 98. 
138 City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., (order granting motion to dismiss amended complaints), n. 118 above, pp. 
6 and 12. 
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that of their counterparts,139 thus highlighting a critical flaw in the reasoning of the district court 
in Oakland. Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit recently confirmed in the climate change case 
against the US federal government Juliana v. United States, the presence of multiple links in the 
causal chain does not preclude from establishing causation,140 although dismissing it for the 
alleged lack of redressability.141  
Overall, arguments against allowing climate change liability cases against private emitters to be 
decided on the merits may be dictated more by political reasons rather than legal or scientific142 
and it is no secret that claimants in such cases face an uphill battle. Therefore, there is no reason 
for them not to explore those options that could potentially alleviate it. It is difficult to predict 
whether a prospective climate change liability claim based on Vedanta could succeed in England 
or elsewhere. However, the fact that it is possible, and that the “upƌeŵe Couƌt͛s deĐisioŶ iŶ 
Vedanta seemingly indicates that English courts could have jurisdiction to hear such claims, may 
open an entirely new chapter in the climate change liability litigation against private GHG 
emitters. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Just one month after the UK “upƌeŵe Couƌt͛s deĐisioŶ in Vedanta, the Zambian government 
aŶŶouŶĐed its plaŶs to seize ĐoŶtƌol of KCM͛s assets.143 If these plans materialize, it would be 
questionable whether the case could progress to the merits stage. Ironically, this situation 
corroborates the “upƌeŵe Couƌt͛s ƌefleĐtioŶs oŶ the ͚dispƌopoƌtioŶate ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh these 
juƌisdiĐtioŶ issues haǀe ďeeŶ litigated͛.144 Indeed, it took nearly four years of litigation, nearly 300 
pages of written cases and nearly 9,000 pages of electronic documents145 as well as going all the 
way from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court to resolve the question of jurisdiction, 
which may now be of little practical use for the claimants. Interestingly, in its considerations on 
whether Zambia would be a proper forum to try the matter, the High Court also anticipated a 
 
139 See OHCHR Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (No. A/74/161) (2019), available at 
http://www.srenvironment.org/sites/default/files/Reports/2019/UNGA%20Safe%20Climate%20Report%
202019.pdf.  
140 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 2020) 
141 Ibid. at 1169-1175. 
142 See K. FisĐheƌ Kuh, ͚JudiĐial Cliŵate EŶgageŵeŶt͛ (2020) 46 (forthcoming) Ecology Law Quarterly. See 
also M. Burger, R. Horton & J. Wentz, n. 121 above, at 141, noting that attribution science is not always 
effective at persuading courts to take action on climate change – Ŷot oŶlǇ due to the ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ aŶd 
liŵitatioŶs iŶ the sĐieŶĐe͛ ďut also due to politiĐal ďaƌƌieƌs. 
143 See T.C. MitiŵiŶgi & M. Hill, ͚ Zambia Files NotiĐe of PlaŶs to “eize VedaŶta Coppeƌ Assets͛ (20 May 2019), 
available at 
 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-20/zambia-files-notification-of-plans-to-take-over-
vedanta-assets. The decision is being implemented through a petition that has been filed in the Zambian 
High Court by ZCC-IH to liquidate KCM. “ee C. Phiƌi, ͚ KCM Placed under Liquidation͛ ;Ϯϭ MaǇ 2019), available 
at https://zambiareports.com/2019/05/21/kcm-placed-liquidation/. 
144 Vedanta, para. 6. 
145 Ibid., para. 10. 
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similar scenario when it theorized that Vedanta may liquidate KCM in order to avoid paying out 
claims if it lost the trial in Zambia.146 
Still, the relevance of the decision cannot be understated. While it may not necessarily open the 
floodgates for environmental and climate change claims against English companies given their 
costs and other constraints, Vedanta is an important precedent for providing access to justice for 
foreign claimants in transnational corporate liability litigation.147 In the wake of this decision, at 
least some English companies may revise their policies and responsibilities for the maintenance 
of standards of environmental control over the activities of their foreign subsidiaries to avoid 
prospective lawsuits. It can only be hoped for that such revisions would require the foreign 
subsidiaries to exercise due diligence148 and not, on the contrary, create an illusory distance 
between them and the parent companies in order to shield the latter from liability. That said, it 
must also be acknowledged that even in case of successful outcome, litigation in the English, or 
other developed countries͛ courts would not solve the underlying problems that claimants in the 
developing countries like Zambia or Nigeria face. It would not bolster the expertise within the 
legal circles, nor the enforcement in these countries. However, it can be critical in achieving 
justice – something indispensable to those, who for various reasons were forsaken by both their 
national institutions and the international community. 
 
146 Lungowe, para. 79.  
147 See, for example, Curran, n. 60 above, at 443, arguing that Vedanta and other similar cases in the 
common law jurisdictions could also be taken into account by the US courts, to a more extent than cases 
in civil law jurisdictions.   
148 See Sherman, n. 70 above, at 29. 
